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Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or verified paper record (VPR) is a method of providing feedback to voters using a ballotless voting system. A VVPAT is intended as an independent verification system for voting machines designed to allow voters to verify that their vote was cast correctly, to detect possible election fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the stored electronic results. The VVPAT offers some fundamental differences as a paper, rather than computer memory, recording medium when storing votes. A paper VVPAT is readable by the human eye and voters can directly interpret their vote. Computer memory requires a device and software which potentially is proprietary. Insecure voting machine〔See page 3 of: 〕 records could potentially be changed quickly without detection by the voting machine itself. It would be more difficult for voting machines to corrupt records without human intervention. Corrupt or malfunctioning voting machines might store votes other than as intended by the voter unnoticed. A VVPAT allows voters the possibility to verify that their votes are cast as intended and can serve as an additional barrier to changing or destroying votes. The VVPAT includes a direct recording electronic voting system (DRE), to assure voters that their votes have been recorded as intended. It is intended, and some argue necessary, as a means by which to detect fraud and equipment malfunction. Depending on election laws the paper audit trail may constitute a legal ballot and therefore provide a means by which a manual vote count can be conducted if a recount is necessary. The solution was first demonstrated (New York City, March 2001) and used (Sacramento,CA 2002) by AVANTE International Technology, Inc.. In non-document ballot voting systems – both mechanical voting machines and DRE voting machines – the voter does not have an option to review a tangible ballot to confirm the voting system accurately recorded his or her intent. In addition, an election official is unable to manually recount ballots in the event of a dispute. Because of this, critics claim there is an increased chance for electoral fraud or malfunction and security experts, such as Bruce Schneier, have demanded voter-verifiable paper audit trails. Non-document ballot voting systems allow only a recount of the "stored votes." These "stored votes" might not represent the correct voter intent if the machine has been corrupted or suffered malfunction. A fundamental hurdle in the implementation of paper audit trails is the performance and authority of the audit. Paper audit systems increase the cost of electronic voting systems, can be difficult to implement, often require specialized external hardware, and can be difficult to use. In the United States, 27 states require a paper audit trail by statute or regulation for all direct recording electronic voting machines used in public elections.〔See: 〕 Another 18 states do not require them but use them either statewide or in local jurisdictions.〔(Forbes.com: Paper Jams a Problem for Electronic Voting )〕 In India, Voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) system was introduced in 8 of 543 parliamentary constituencies as a pilot project in Indian general election, 2014.〔http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-evm-paper-trail-introduced-in-8-of-543-constituencies-1982463〕〔http://www.business-standard.com/article/elections-2014/ls-polls-voters-to-get-automated-receipts-at-gandhinagar-114042901134_1.html〕〔http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/vvpat-machine-to-be-on-demonstration-for-10-days/article5868161.ece〕〔http://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/vvpat-to-be-introduced-in-jadavpur-constituency-35049.html〕 VVPAT is implemented in Lucknow, Gandhinagar, Bangalore South, Chennai Central, Jadavpur, Raipur, Patna Sahib and Mizoram constituencies.〔(8 seats having VVPAT facility )〕〔http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/lok-sabha-elections-2014/news/Patna-Sahib-electorate-can-see-who-they-voted-for/articleshow/33351551.cms〕〔http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/lok-sabha-elections-2014/news/EVM-slip-will-help-verify-your-vote/articleshow/34304320.cms〕〔http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/patna/400-EVMs-on-standby-for-Patna-Sahib-Pataliputra/articleshow/33836327.cms〕〔http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/VVPAT-to-Debut-in-B%E2%80%99lore-South/2014/04/04/article2148837.ece〕 Voter-verified paper audit trail was first used in an election in India in September 2013 in Noksen (Assembly Constituency) in Nagaland. ==History== When a voter casts a vote on a direct-recording voting machine, the voter "has no knowledge through his senses that he has accomplished a result. The most that can be said, is, ''if'' the machine worked as intended, then he ... has voted."〔Horatio Rogers, (19 R.I. 729) opinion of the Justices in re voting machine: dissent. (Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ), Vol. XIX, E.L. Freeman & Sons, Providence (1898); 732-735, quotation from the bottom of page 734.〕 This observation was made by Horatio Rogers in 1897, and it remains as true with DRE voting machines as it was with the early mechanical voting machines that Rogers spoke about. In 1899, Joseph Gray addressed this problem with a mechanical voting machine that simultaneously recorded votes in its mechanism and punched those votes on a paper ballot that the voter could inspect before dropping it in a ballot box. Gray explained that "in this manner we have a mechanical check for the tickets (), while the ticket is also a check upon the register (vote counter )."〔Joseph A. Gray, Voting-machine, , issued Mar. 7, 1899; quoted from lines 103-105, page 2.〕 This check is only effective, of course, if there is an audit to compare the paper and mechanical records. The idea of creating a parallel paper trail for a direct-recording voting mechanism remained dormant for a century, until it was rediscovered by Rebecca Mercuri, who suggested essentially the same idea in 1992.〔Rebecca T. Mercuri, Physical verifiability of computer systems, Proc. 5th International Computer Virus and Security Conference. (Reposted on the web ) with added notes in 2005.〕 The Mercuri method, as some have called it, was refined in her Ph.D. dissertation in October 2000; in her final version, the paper record is printed behind glass so that the voter may not take it or alter it.〔Rebecca T. Mercuri, A better ballot box, (IEEE Spectrum ), Oct. 2002; pages 46-50.〕 The first commercial voting systems to incorporate voter verified paper audit trail printers were the Avante Vote Trakker and a retrofit to the Sequoia AVC Edge called the VeriVote Printer.〔Douglas W. Jones and Barbara Simons, Broken Ballots, CSLI Publications, 2012; see Section 5.5, pages 111-115.〕 Avante's system saw its first trial use in 2002, and in 2003, the state of Nevada required the use of VVPAT technology statewide and adopted the Sequoia system. It is notable that, in Avante's design, the shield preventing the voter from taking the paper record was an afterthought, while in Sequoia's design, the paper record for successive voters were printed sequentially on a single roll of paper. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Voter-verified paper audit trail」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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